Shanghai Meat Grinder

By: Dale Cozort 

 

 


What actually happened: The core of Nationalist Chinese military strength was 30 divisions of comparatively well-equipped and German-trained troops. Chiang threw the best of those troops into the fight for Shanghai, where they took horrendous casualties, sometimes as high as 90 percent, and lost most of their equipment. By the end of the battle for Shanghai, Nationalist China had lost most of its combat power, including the men Chiang had been counting on to train the rest of the Chinese army, and the Japanese could take essentially any part of China it chose to take until Japanese forces became so stretched by the demands of occupying that huge territory that their combat power was significantly reduced and the Chinese were able to re-establish defenses. 

Chiang chose to burn off his combat power in the battle for Shanghai partly because he felt that a serious Chinese effort there would draw in the Western powers. There was a strong school of Chinese thinking that said that the US would not allow China to fall into Japanese hands if the Chinese proved themselves willing to fight. That may ultimately have been correct, but it didn’t take into account the fact that it would take over four years before the US would join the fighting. 

What might have happened: Given a little less wishful thinking, Chiang could done a couple of things. First, he might have been able to avoid fighting in Shanghai altogether, or at least keep it to a low level. The Japanese were somewhat divided on whether or not to escalate in Shanghai, and most of what passed for a government probably would have preferred to avoid an escalation of fighting in Shanghai, at least partly because the huge international community in the area made the fighting entirely too public for their tastes. If they chose to make a major effort in Shanghai, Chiang could have chosen to make it a meat-grinder for Japan rather than for his own army. In an urban environment like that, conventionally trained and armed armies have some advantage over less well-trained and armed ones, but that advantage is minimized. 

Let’s say Chiang delays the escalation of fighting around Shanghai as much as he can, maybe three weeks to a month. Then he sends cannon-fodder-hastily trained and poorly armed but highly motivated volunteers--with a minimal number of volunteers from his effective troops as a stiffener--into battle around Shanghai. As they die, he sends in more, this time a little more effectively trained, because he’s had more time to train them. He holds the bulk of his effective troops back and lets the fight for Shanghai blunt the Japanese edge for as long as he can-hopefully a month or longer. 

I would guess that the Japanese buildup around Shanghai would be slower in this time-line than in ours because the opposition would seem less formidable. I could see a gradual escalation as the quality of the Chinese troops in opposition improved, then a more rapid escalation as the Japanese grew impatient at their slow progress in the fighting. 

Meanwhile, Chiang moves as much of the militarily useful industry as he can out of the area around Shanghai. Unfortunately for the Nationalists, around 90 percent of the industry under their control was in the area around Shanghai, and much of the Nationalists’ revenue came from the area. Given the primitive state of China’s economy, keeping that industry was vital. In our time-line Chiang worked hard to get that industry out of the area, and managed to move some of it. In this time-line, the slower pace of escalation helps the evacuation. 

At some point, the Japanese try to end the fighting by doing an amphibious assault to cut off the Chinese fighting inside Shanghai, just as they did in our time-line. Chiang would probably have to send at least some of his well-trained troops into that fighting, at least long enough to give the surviving defenders a chance to get out. At that point, the Japanese have taken Shanghai pretty much on the same schedule as in our time-line, but Chiang still has an effective military to defend the rest of his territory. He can use it to trade space for time, while the Japanese get weaker as they disperse over more and more Chinese territory. 

At some point, Chiang will still have to fight, maybe on the approaches to Nanking, but his comparatively well-trained and armed troops will be facing an exhausted and over-stretched enemy. Also, both the Soviets and the US sent aid of various kinds to the Nationalists over the course of 1937 and early 1938. The Chinese would have men capable of using that aid more effectively. To some extent, the stronger China is at the end of the Shanghai fighting, the stronger they grow over the course of late 1937 and 1938. More well-trained men surviving the battle means more men to train new recruits, and defend ports where supplies can be smuggled past the Japanese blockade. Would that be enough to give them a fighting chance?

Can the Nationalist Chinese pull off the same kind of strategy that the Soviet Union pulled off against the Germans? If they can, how does that affect relations between the Soviets and Japanese? They fought a mid-sized border war in 1938, and an even bigger one in 1939. 

How does a stronger Nationalist China impact the rest of World War II? Is there a Pearl Harbor? A Midway? A Japanese campaign against Malaysia and Singapore? If not, the changes start rippling out through the rest of the world. If China is stronger, then Japan will be weaker on the Manchurian border with the Soviet Union. Does that mean that the Soviets pull out their good troops on that border in say August rather than November? If so, what happens? Do they get frittered away in the late summer fighting? What do you think? Does this have potential? Should I go on?

Nationalist Military Preparations

The Nationalist Chinese knew they would have to fight the Japanese sooner or later, and they were preparing for that war as best they could given very limited industrial and financial resources and the demands of continuing civil wars against the Communists and various warlords.   At least some Nationalists believed that their preparations would be reasonably complete by 1940.

The Nationalists were to some extent doing the same thing that the Soviets were.  They were building heavy industry in relatively inaccessible areas, and trying to build up an arms industry.  In 1937, the Nationalists  were building small arms, and ammunition for both small arms and light artillery.  They were trying desperately to get production of light artillery going.  They were producing a handful of license-built Italian bombers and trying to get an Italian-designed fighter into production.

The best Nationalist divisions were well-trained by some very good German soldiers, most of whom left on Hitler’s orders after the fighting with Japan broke out.   The Nationalist air force was mostly Italian-trained, an unfortunate choice as the Nationalists found out when serious fighting started.


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Copyright 2000 By Dale R. Cozort