The
Ukrainian Option
(part two)
In last POD I briefly outlined a scenario where Hitler uses Ukrainian nationalists to destabilize the part of Poland where Ukrainians are a majority. He then uses a Ukrainian revolt as an excuse to seize part of Poland without getting into a war with England and France. I'm going to expand on that scenario in this month's contribution.
There are two things to keep in mind as we go on in this scenario. First, the Ukrainians do not trust Hitler in the least. They are divided to some extent on whether or not Hitler can be used to help get an independent Ukraine, but they almost universally distrust him.
Second, Hitler got as far as he did before he started a war for several reasons. One was the strong current of pacifism in England and France. Another was that English and French were in a precarious position financially. They weren't completely over the Great Depression, and they didn't have the financial strength to match Hitler's buildup while still maintaining their empires and their standards of living. An important and often overlooked factor is that Hitler was also able to play on a strong current of opinion in England, and to a lesser degree in France, which felt that the Versailles Treaty ending World War I was unfair-a victors' peace. Many people in England felt that the post-World War I boundaries just set things up for another war, and could justly be altered to prevent that war. Appeasement was not entirely about fear of Hitler. It was also about feeling that Germany, along with Hungary and a few other countries, had genuinely been mistreated at the end of World War I, and could justly be allowed to alter those unfair borders.
Hitler's Ukrainian gambit would play to the "revise boundaries for justice" crowd. It would also give the French and English a fig leaf for doing what they wanted to do anyway, which was to postpone the war and hope that Hitler would either finish bankrupting Germany or pick a fight with someone else, preferably the Soviets. I think that there is a good chance that the French and English would have stayed out as long as the Germans didn't push into indisputably Polish territory.
(By the way, there is some evidence that poor French communications security was a major factor in Hitler's string of diplomatic triumphs in the prewar era. There is a considerable amount of evidence that the Germans were reading French diplomatic codes and probably military ones too. That may have allowed Hitler to gamble more successfully than he ordinarily would have been able to. It is easy to look like a genius when you know what your main opponents are thinking-what they fear and what they are willing and unwilling to fight for.)
The Poles would probably react by finishing their mobilization and launching a massive and futile counterattack. They would be at Hitler's mercy if the seizure of the Polish Corridor and the Ukrainian-speaking east was allowed to stand. They would have borders only with Germany and the Soviets. The Ukrainian-speaking area also contained almost all of Poland's oil fields, so losing it would make the Poles an economic basket case, totally dependent on either the Soviets or the Germans for passage of vital goods like oil.
I'm not sure how the Soviets would react to the arrival of German troops on their border and the setting up of a pro-German Ukrainian state in the ruins of eastern Poland. In our time-line the Soviets were fighting a mid-sized border war with Japan in September 1939. A lot of their best troops were involved in that. I'm not sure that the Soviets would have escalated with Japan in the absence of a Hitler/Stalin pact though. Stalin might have put up with Japanese provocations in the East in order to be ready for any German move on the Polish Ukraine. In that case, we might see a three-cornered war over the Polish Ukraine in September 1939. Or Stalin might grab off his own chunk of Poland, probably in the northeastern Byelorussian-speaking area-or he might make a quick grab to "protect" the oil wells of the Polish Ukraine and hope that Hitler wouldn't risk war.
I suspect that in 1939 Japan would jump into the war if the Soviets and Germans got into it. They wouldn't have had the experience of getting clobbered by the Soviets, so they would be eager to fight, at least for a while. They were in our time-line's July and August 1939.
So, I suspect that either Hitler gets away with rendering the Poles helpless, or he gets into a war with the Soviets in September 1939. Which is more likely? Which is more fun in the sense of offering insights into our history? I would guess that Stalin would stay out and let the Germans grab what they wanted to. He was a very cautious man. On the other hand, a pro-German Ukraine in Poland supported by German troops was a knife poised at the Soviet throat. I suspect that Stalin would try very hard to get the French and English into the fight, pull all kinds of tricks to keep the Poles fighting until they bled themselves white, and ultimately stay out of things. On the other hand, he might decide that war with Germany was inevitable and it might as well happen while the Poles were still fighting, which offered the chance of dragging the French and English into the war. There would also be an advantage to not allowing the Germans to consolidate their position on the Soviet border. It is a close call as to likelihood on that decision. I suspect that the Soviets getting into a war at this point would be more "fun". I think we'll go with that.
So, when pro-German factions of the Polish Ukrainians revolt, and the Germans sweep in, the Soviets make a grab for the eastern part of Polish Ukraine. They put their best forces and commanders into the push and work on the basis of a plan they have been working on for months as it became obvious what the Germans were planning. They are trying for a fait accompli, which leaves them in possession of the bulk of the Polish Ukraine, plus the oil wells and puts the Germans in a position where they have to decide to attack Soviet troops. The Soviets aren't good enough to pull that off.
There is a wild three-way struggle between the Poles, the Germans, and the Soviets for the Polish Ukraine. The Germans and the pro-German Ukrainians quickly grab the bulk of the Ukraine. The Germans initially try to avoid fighting the Soviets, but in that kind of environment fighting is inevitable, especially since the Ukrainians allied to Germany have no problem with fighting the Soviets. Fighting starts then escalates. The Germans quickly destroy several Soviet divisions and push east. German planes inadvertently cross into Soviet airspace and bomb Soviet towns. The Soviets respond with large-scale but very ineffective air raids by their bomber force. The German general staff hastily pulls out and updates contingency plans for a war with the Soviets.
The Germans are not ready for both a war with Poland and a war with the Soviets. Hitler knows that, but in a way is kind of glad it started. The logical next move would be to knock the Poles completely out of the war, but that would almost inevitably bring in the English and French, and given war with the Soviets, Hitler wants to avoid that at almost any cost. England and France are trying to get the Poles to accept a compromise peace. The Poles aren't buying that. They still think they can take on the Germans, especially given German/Soviet fighting. Hitler is sending signals that he is willing to make peace with Poland, possibly even compensating the Poles for their lost territory by giving them slices of the Soviet Union.
Once their initial plan breaks down, the Soviets show signs of disorganization and weakness. They do outnumber the Germans in the Polish Ukraine though, and the Germans are not willing to throw away the mobility advantage of their panzer divisions. They are also not willing to allow the Soviets to fly from runways just across the border with impunity. The Ukrainians are also a factor in the escalation. They raid into the Soviet Ukraine, trying to raise revolts there. Signs of Soviet weakness, plus the fact that the panzer divisions lose much or their effectiveness without the ability to attack deep into enemy territory leads Hitler to make a grab for a hunk of the Soviet Ukraine before the fall rains make campaigning impossible. The Germans quickly push into the Soviet Ukraine, surrounding several hundred thousand Soviet troops and grabbing off a major part of the Soviet Ukraine. By this time it is mid-October-far too late in the year for a knockout blow against the Soviets, but not too late for the Germans to make another pounce, this time grabbing the vital coal and oil of the Donets(sp) Basin.
There is still one more option to be played before winter. The Soviets and the Germans are each afraid that the other one will grab off the Baltic States of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. They take precautions, which trigger more fears, and finally a preemptive strike by one side or the other. Again, the Germans prove themselves the stronger, pushing the Soviets back out of the Baltics. That puts them within easy striking distance of Leningrad.
The fall rains come. On the poor roads of Eastern Europe, that immobilizes the mechanized units of all of the combatants. Horsed cavalry is now more mobile than panzer divisions. The Poles take advantage of that for another offensive against the Germans. The Germans are actually rather vulnerable. They hold two long arm-like corridors, one on each side of Poland. They don't have the manpower to be strong all along those corridors. The Poles attack along the old Czech border. The Germans are forced to rush troops back from the front in the Ukraine in order to restore the situation.
By this time, Hitler is fed up with the Poles. They are tying up way too much scarce military power. At the same time, the Poles are also attacking Soviet troops in Polish Byelorussia, which is a plus for the Germans. Hitler would like the Poles to be junior partners in a push into the Soviet Union, but that option is going to disappear before long. Hitler knows that the Poles are in a desperate position in spite of their offensives. They are running out of gas, running low on bullets, and facing food shortages. Bravery isn't enough in that situation, and when the Polish offensive runs out of steam the Poles reluctantly ask the French and English to help them get terms. Mussolini plays a role in putting together a peace conference where the Poles reluctantly accept peace pretty much on German terms.
Those terms are not as harsh as they might have been. The Germans figure that they can deal with the Poles at any time once they deal with the Soviets. Poland is forced to give up claim to the Polish Corridor, loses some border areas, and recognizes the independence of what had been the Polish Ukraine. The territory they give up includes the mostly Polish city of Lvov, which is a particularly bitter pill for the Poles to swallow. They also are forced to partly demobilize their army and allow German forces to use some Polish railroads to transit to the front with the Soviets. Both sides know that the "peace" is a truce that will be broken when one of the two sides decides that it is in their interest to do so.
Meanwhile, Stalin is struggling to get a truce of his own. The Japanese Kwangtung army has launched a full-scale offensive from Manchuria. The Tokyo government does not initially authorize that, but signs of Soviet weakness in Europe quickly draw in the rest of the Japanese armed forces. The Japanese navy quickly destroys the small Soviet Far Eastern fleet. The Japanese fleet cuts off resupply to Soviet forces on the divided island of Sakhalin, and Japanese forces head north on that island, looking to capture the small oilfields. Japanese amphibious forces attack several places in the Soviet Far East.
The Japanese get several stinging defeats as they encounter masses of Soviet tanks and artillery. The Soviets do not have the quality of forces in the Far East that they did in our time-lines August 1939 though, and they don't have time to plot out an offensive in every detail. They are forced to react to Japanese moves, and the post-purge Soviet army is not good at reacting to the unexpected. They also have a lot of territory to defend.
The Soviets push the Chinese Communists into making a major effort against the Japanese in China. The Chinese Communist take a lot of casualties, but fight well and distract the Japanese. The Soviets also increase their military aid to the Nationalist Chinese, though they are unwilling to make too large of an effort there because they simply don't have a lot to spare after supplying two war fronts.
There is an informal truce on the Soviet/German front through the fall rainy season. Stalin wants very desperately to get out of war with the Germans, hopefully turning them west to bleed themselves white against the French and English. Failing that, he at least wants the French and English in the war on his side. Local communist parties in France and England suddenly are pushing very hard for anti-fascist solidarity and rearmament. In some French factories in the red belt, it suddenly gets much easier to produce arms. Stalin and the local communists both launch major propaganda offensives in France and England, emphasizing the Nazi menace.
Stalin also plays on Polish desires for revenge against the Nazis. He turns the areas in Byelorussia that the Soviets had occupied back to the Poles, and returns most of the Polish prisoners of war that he has seized. He allows the Poles to import small amounts of ammunition and key equipment through the Soviet Union. He also secretly sells the Poles a couple of hundred old T26 tanks. That's trivial for the Soviets, but it more than doubles the number of effective tanks in the Polish arsenal. The idea is vintage twisty Stalinist thinking: get the Poles back into the war, which should force the Germans to crush and occupy the rest of Poland, which in turn should force the west to intervene. He makes sure that news of the tank sale 'leaks' to the Germans.
The Poles are desperately trying to rev up their tiny and devastated industrial base to replace weapons and ammunition lost in the war. They can produce fairly large numbers of small arms, much of their own ammunition, and small quantities of more complex weapons like artillery, planes, and tanks. Much of their small industrial base was in ethnically mixed areas near the German border, and was lost in the September war. They put what they have left on a war footing, and actually manage to increase production of most types of weapons. By year-end, a few new types are coming on line, including the first handful of 10TP tanks (roughly equivalent to the Soviet BT-series tanks) and somewhat improved versions of the Polish gull-winged fighters.
The old Polish military dictatorship has fallen after the dismal performance of the army in the September war. The new government would dearly love to take on the Germans again, but they are a bit more realistic than the pre-war Polish government. They figure that Poland will have to fight again, but they hope that it can be after the Germans have exhausted themselves against the Soviets. The September war has shown very graphically how far behind the Poles have fallen militarily. They need time to re-equip their airforce with modern low-wing monoplane fighters, and to build a tank force capable of matching the panzer divisions. Even more importantly, they need to build up military communications and design mobilization plans that don't take months to implement.
How they will do that with an impoverished remnant of their country is the multi-million dollar question. They hope that part of the answer can come from French loans, and part of it from fund drives from Poles living abroad, especially in the United States. The English help a bit by buying the entire Polish destroyer flotilla. The Poles no longer have a coast, and they desperately need the money for more pressing things. They still have a very long way to go. Polish low-wing monoplane fighters comparable to the Bf109 are still in the prototype stage, and the rapid advances of German aviation means that the Poles are shooting for a moving target.
The Roosevelt administration has passed a small package of "humanitarian" and "industrial rebuilding" loans for the Poles. It includes a lot of radios and trucks. Roosevelt is wary of doing too much because he is afraid that he'll encourage the Poles into a futile war, or push Hitler into a preemptive strike against the Poles.
The French and the English have somewhat the same attitude. Both countries are still rearming, and still feel that they are militarily inferior to the Germans. The Soviet/German conflict takes a little bit of the edge off of that fear, but the western allies are very aware that they may eventually face a German stronger from her eastern conquests.
The Germans are facing their own set of problems. In September 1939 they were prepared for a conquest-of-Poland-sized war. They were nowhere close to prepared for a conquest-of-the-Soviet Union-sized war. German stocks of all kinds of mundane but vital goods are nearly exhausted. They need to rebuild or replace trucks, repair tanks, rebuild nearly exhausted stocks of bombs and other ammunition. They need to change over the gauge of the railroads in conquered areas of the Soviet Union. They need to take feuding nationalist Ukrainian factions and mold them into a government strong enough that Germany can credibly claim to have liberated the Ukraine, but not strong enough to challenge German interests there. They also need to gear up for the coming Russian winter.
Hitler would like to treat the Ukraine and Soviet prisoners of war in about the same way he treated them in our time-line. He is constrained to some extent in this time-line by the fact that he has to be concerned about western public opinion. The Germans have droves of Soviet prisoners of war-as many as six hundred thousand of them. They treat Russian-speaking prisoners harshly, but not nearly as harshly as in our time-line. Ukrainians and men from the various Moslem areas of the Soviet Union are often released to the new Ukrainian army, or in some cases given the option of joining special units of the German army or SS.
The new Ukrainian army is not a particularly combat-worthy force. It has a mixture of captured Polish and Soviet equipment, along with some Czech small arms. The Germans deliberately try to control the growth of that army and channel its capabilities into those appropriate for an internal security force. The Ukrainians are trying to build something capable of fighting the Soviets, and if need be, the Germans. In fall of 1939 they have a long ways to go. The Germans have grabbed most of the really good captured Soviet equipment, especially the artillery. Fortunately for the Ukrainians, the German victory came swiftly enough that most of Ukrainian heavy industry was captured intact. They have the industrial capacity to build a modern army if they can keep control over it. The Germans are working hard to get effective control over Ukrainian industry and natural resources, while not pushing Ukrainian nationalists into open revolt.
The loss of the Ukraine with winter coming on is a major blow to the Soviets. Ukrainian coal, iron, and farm products are a vital part of the Soviet economy-much more so in 1939 than they would have been in 1941. The development of the Urals into an alternate industrial base just started in earnest in 1938. It is nowhere near where it was in 1941 in our time-line. The Soviets need the Ukraine back. They mobilize huge numbers of men, and form an army that on paper should be able to swamp the Germans. During the fall rainy season, Stalin quietly negotiates with Hitler, while building up for a winter offensive if that proves necessary. As happened in our time-line, that massive mobilization dilutes the quality of the Soviet Army, as the already decimated officer corps is forced to deal with an enormous influx of untrained or poorly trained conscripts.
While the mud prevents effective operations against the Germans, Stalin shifts troops east and prepares to teach the Kwangtung army and the Japanese as a whole a painful lesson. The Soviets can't support as massive an army in the Far East as they can in Europe, but they can bring in good equipment and what remains of their elite units after the Ukrainian fiasco. In October and early November, the Soviets launch a massive strike against the Japanese along the Manchurian and Northern Chinese border. The counter-offensive forces the Japanese to strip the Chinese fronts of most of their offensive capacity. Then the Communist Chinese launch a second major offensive against the weakened Japanese.
With the Japanese on the defensive, Stalin shifts emphasis back to the Germans. As the cold freezes the Ukrainian mud, the Soviets launch a massive, carefully planned offensive. The first attack is an attempt to retake the Donets Basin. As the Germans scramble to stop that offensive, the Soviets launch an even larger one designed to slice down through the western part of what had been the Soviet Ukraine with a massive armor-led force and cut off the bulk of the German army inside the Ukraine. It isn't a bad plan, but the Soviet army of late 1939 is nowhere near capable of pulling it off against the Germans.
The Germans fight on the defensive with a considerable amount of skill, switching mobile forces back and forth as needed. The Soviets break through in places by sheer mass, but the Panzers quickly cut off and destroy the spearheads of those breakthroughs. The offensive continues long after it makes any sense, and the Germans efficiently rack up hundreds of thousands of Soviet dead, before going onto the offensive and capturing over a million and a half more Soviets.
The German offensive takes the form of pincer movements along the northern Ukrainian border, which then combines with an offensive out of Lithuania to cut off the bulk of Soviet forces in the west, along with an airdrop to close off the last remaining escape routes. Hundreds of thousands more Soviet troops flee east with little or no equipment, while hundreds of thousands more seek refuge in Poland and are interned. By the time the pincer closes, though, the Russian winter is in full swing, and the Germans are by no means ready for it. There is very little except the winter weather to keep the Germans from advancing, but that is enough. German units seek whatever shelter they can, and the Soviets have a reprieve with which to rebuild their armies.
The Soviets still hold several major industrial areas, and still have massive manpower resources. The trick is to build armies before the Germans adapt to the cold and resume the offensive. The Soviets are rebuilding with essentially the same equipment that they have lost. The T34 is nearly a year away from even initial production. The KV-1 is available in small numbers, as are some new heavy multi-turreted tanks, but most tank production goes into slightly improved BT-series, T26, and T28 tanks as well as some lighter tanks. Without western aid to fill the gap, the Soviets have to produce large quantities fast, so they deliberately avoid doing anything to disrupt assembly lines even a little bit. In those circumstances, new weapons design takes a very low priority for the short term. For the slightly longer term, Stalin orders that design work focus on new designs that can be brought into mass production within six months, which leaves the T34 out.
The Germans are also scrambling. Hitler senses a chance to knock the Soviets out of the war quickly, and he pushes the German army to launch another offensive as quickly as possible. On the ground, the German army is too busy surviving the winter to do much else. Shipments of winter clothing and other cold-weather supplies take priority. Hundreds of thousands of German soldiers suffer from frostbite or other weather-related problems. It isn't as bad as winter of 1941 in our time-line, because for now the Soviets don't have much offensive capability, but it does take a little of the fighting edge off of the German army.
The loss of experienced officers and non-coms means that the German army of spring 1940 is subtly but definitely not quite as good as it was in the fall of 1939. That is especially true of the airborne component. They have taken very heavy casualties.
The Germans are helped immensely by the large quantities of Soviet equipment that they capture. On the other hand, the sheer number of Soviet prisoners taken overwhelms German ability to deal with the POW's, and thousands of prisoners die of exposure during the winter months. Hitler doesn't really mind that, but he does have to be conscious of how that will play in the west. He is forced to divert scarce logistics resources to keeping up at least an appearance of trying to care for the POWs.
The Poles have both a windfall and an embarrassment. They get a windfall of Soviet equipment, including large amounts of small arms, some artillery, a few hundred tanks and even a few dozen Soviet planes. On the other hand, they get several hundred thousand Soviet troops to guard. Several thousand of those troops are from the old Soviet Ukraine, and the new Ukrainian government wants them back. The Polish government has correct but icy relations with the Ukrainians, so the process of returning those POWs becomes an additional source of friction between the Poles and Ukrainians.
In mid-February 1940, the Germans get their act together enough for a limited offensive as the weather gets a little better. They only have enough logistics capacity to support an offensive on one part of the line. They choose Moscow over Leningrad or the Caucasus oil. The Germans can still access the world oil market, so Hitler doesn't feel the sense of urgency in getting access to oil that he did in our time-line.
By that time the Soviets have had over a month to get their act together. It doesn't seem to help much. The Germans crash through Soviet defenses and head toward Moscow. They make it to the edge of Moscow in about three weeks, slowed mainly by the weather. The Soviets throw waves of partially trained, poorly armed divisions at them, trying to buy time until the spring thaw immobilizes German tanks. That works to some extent. The Germans are still in very poor shape logistically, which helps the Soviets quite a bit.
By mid-March, the Germans are fighting inside the western part of Moscow. The Soviets are at much less of a disadvantage in city fighting, and German casualties start to rise again. The Germans would like to bypass the city and leave the Soviet troops cut off, but the mud makes that kind of maneuver difficult. The Germans do cut the Moscow to Leningrad railway, but they can't surround Moscow completely, and are forced to slog through the city street-by-street.
The Soviets still have large amounts of manpower, though only about two-thirds of what they did at the beginning of the war. They are trying to turn that manpower into trained soldiers. The mud gives them a chance to do that to some extent, but a few months isn't enough to do the training necessary to turn out soldiers capable of meeting the Germans on anything like even terms. The Soviets take inordinately heavy casualties whenever they deal with the Germans, even in the Moscow city fighting.
The Soviet armies also need equipment. The sheer scope, speed, and unexpected nature of the German offensives have meant that less industrial equipment and trained manpower can be evacuated to the Urals. There is also much less of an industrial base in the Urals to be added to. The Soviets can't rebuild armies on anything like the scale they did in 1941 and 1942 in our time-line. They still have much more resilience than the Germans give them credit for though.
Stalin is planning a surprise for the Germans for when the ground hardens from the spring thaw. He is doing somewhat the same thing he did at Stalingrad in our time-line-putting in enough manpower to keep the Germans from clearing Moscow, while building reserves for an attempt to cut off German troops in the city. That's a good idea, but the spring 1940 Soviets aren't capable of pulling it off. The Germans turn the offensive into a fiasco, killing hundreds of thousands of poorly trained and equipped Soviet troops, and capturing hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Moscow is surrounded by June 1940, and falls a few weeks later.
At this point, Stalin is desperate for a negotiated peace. Japan is back on the offensive in the Far East, and the Soviets need time to rebuild their armies. Hitler doesn't think he needs to give Stalin a peace that Stalin can live with. Hitler demands that the Soviets give up all non-Russian lands in the USSR, reduce their army to 100,000 men, hand over vast quantities of weapons, give up large chunks of the Far East to the Japanese, and agree to huge war reparations in the form of food and raw materials.
Stalin is desperate enough to think about going for that kind of peace, but not for very long. He sets in motion plans to rebuild in the Urals. The Soviet Army switches from holding every inch of ground to delaying tactics-giving the Soviets time to move equipment and people out of the way of the German advance. Leningrad falls in late June, but the Germans find the city's infrastructure utterly gutted by the Soviets.
The surviving people of Leningrad have no food, and no sources of water. The Germans have a choice of using scarce trains and trucks to feed Russian civilians or using them to continue the advance. Hitler chooses to continue the advance, and the starving people of Leningrad become a major theme of Soviet propaganda, both internally and externally.
Hitler thinks he has the war won, and becomes much less concerned about western public opinion. That is reflected in a more obvious harshness toward Soviet civilians, and a harder line toward Poland and the Ukraine. Hitler focuses a late summer offensive on the southern part of the front, going after the Caucasus oil fields. He is aided by local revolts by nationalists in the various non-Russian areas.
Those revolts are, surprisingly, the only major sign of disintegration in the Soviet-held part of the USSR. Stalin is very good at keeping political control. The Germans inadvertently help him by their increasingly arrogant and ruthless behavior toward Soviet civilians. The Red Army helps that reputation along by creating logistical deserts in front of the Germans-destroying everything that can't be carried away, including food and water sources, but leaving the unskilled part of the population in place to die after the Germans have captured the area. The Soviets also leave guerilla bands behind to deliberately provoke German reprisals.
Those tactics slow the German advance, while the Soviets train and equip new armies. By August, those armies are getting fairly large numbers of KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks. Those tanks are a major problem for the Germans. Standard German tank and anti-tank guns can't knock them out, though the German "88" anti-aircraft gun can. A few well-placed and skillfully handled KV-1's can hold up the German advance for a surprisingly long time.
Stalin desperately needs victories to bolster Soviet morale. He also needs one less enemy. His armies are still not ready to take on the Germans, but the Japanese have essentially no counter for the Soviet heavy tanks. The Soviets carefully build up forces in the Far East, then launch an ambitious surprise offensive against the Japanese Kwangtung army in Manchuria. The Japanese can barely handle Soviet late model BT-7 tanks, and KV-1's are almost invulnerable. The Soviets have also learned quite a bit from the Germans in term of how to handle armor, while the Japanese still scatter their armor in little packets among the infantry.
In August 1940, the Soviets launch a blitzkrieg-style offensive against the Japanese. They quickly capture the northern third of Manchuria, and destroy or capture nearly half of the Kwangtung army's divisions. The Japanese are forced to strip away much of their remaining power in China to stabilize the line. The Nationalist and Communist Chinese race to fill the vacuum left by the Japanese pullout.
The Japanese aren't willing to formally end the war, given the continued German advance, but they are no longer in a position to take offensive action in the Far East. The Soviets move the best of their Far Eastern divisions west and replace them with raw recruits. That gives them a core of trained and equipped manpower to use against the Germans.
The Soviet/German balance of power is beginning to shift. In spite of their losses in industry, the Soviets are still able come close to matching German production. That's true because the Germans have failed to gear up for a long war or to rationalize production. The Germans are pushing deeper and deeper into Russia, which is wearing out their trucks and tanks, while making their already fragile logistics structure weaker and weaker. German manpower gets spread thinner and thinner by the shear amount of territory they have to maintain control in.
The Soviets are also learning how get the most out of their resources. They produce massive numbers of tracked anti-tank vehicles based on light tank chassis and a 45mm antitank gun. The combination is very inexpensive to build, but can knock out any German tank of fall 1940. The Soviets preserve their own tank force while spending the little SP guns and their crews like water.
At the same time, the string of easy victories has made Hitler more and more arrogant. As the front with the Soviets gets further and further away, the Germans feel that they don't really need Ukrainian nationalist support any more. The Ukrainians have become an increasing obstacle to German exploitation of their wealth. The Germans help a dissident Ukrainian faction plot a coup, hoping to create a more pliable government.
The Ukrainian government is wary of the Germans. They become aware of the coup plot and infiltrate the ranks of the plotters. They also quietly prepare to defend themselves against the Germans if that becomes necessary. There are still quite a few German troops in the Ukraine, but they are primarily logistics or internal security people. The bulk of German combat power is a long way away.
The Germans are also reminding the Poles why they hate the Germans. German troops and supplies have been going through Poland for months. The Poles have required that the arms and soldiers go through on separate trains, and have tried to minimize contact between the Germans and Polish civilians. Frictions are inevitable though. In August 1940, a German soldier accidentally kills a Polish railway worker in fight that was partly provoked the Polish man. The Poles want to try the soldier. The Germans refuse to let the man be tried.
In mid-August, Polish railway workers stage a slow-down, threatening the already fragile German supply network to the east. The Germans are in no mood for that sort of thing, so they give the Polish government an ultimatum threatening an invasion if the slowdown isn't crushed, and demanding complete German control over some key railroads. They back up that demand by shutting down all imports to Poland. Since they or the Ukrainians control the entire Polish border, Hitler figures that the Poles will quickly be forced to give in.
The Polish government has long figured that a showdown with the Germans is inevitable in the long-term. They have spent the last nine months preparing for it in every way their limited resources allow. They aren't ready for another round yet, but they have prepared rationally and reasonably well. Polish public opinion won't allow their government to accept German control of Polish railways. The Poles reluctantly decide that if another war with Germany is inevitable, it might as well be soon, while a large part of the German army is tied up deep in the Soviet Union. At the same time, they would prefer to stall long enough that the fall rainy season cuts down German mobility. The Poles reject the demand for control of their railroad system but say that they will negotiate an end to the slowdown in exchange for the reopening of borders.
Hitler is very tired of having to deal with the Poles. He asks the army to draw up plans for an invasion, while continuing the economic blockade. His generals quietly but unanimously inform him that an invasion of Poland would require that the Germans pull back to more defensible positions in the Soviet Union, and it would still take nearly a month to prepare for. For now, the German army would be hard-pressed to keep the Poles from retaking the Polish Corridor and other territories lost the Germany in the September 1939 conflict.
Hitler is appalled. He orders that the army at least be in position to mount a credible defense if the economic blockade leads to war. The army manages to comb out eight reasonably good divisions from security duties behind the eastern front, and adds them to the border defense people on the German/Polish border.
Hitler wants to finish off the Soviet Union before winter, so he allows the situation to be temporarily defused. He needs Polish cooperation for the moment. He also orders that the army be ready to attack Poland in the spring. In the meantime, he orders that a contingency plan for an out-of-the-blue attack on the Poles be drawn up. That plan involves pulling almost all remaining German combat power off of the French/German border and using it to slice through Poland. There isn't much German combat power on that border to begin with though, and he German generals are very skeptical of the plan.
The Poles have been quietly working on their mobilization system, making it flexible and as efficient as their limited transportation system allows. They have also quietly made contact with the Ukrainian government and Czech exiles, trying to find common ground for cooperation. Those potential allies are extremely wary of the Poles, due to their interactions during the inter-war years, but all three countries have had up-close-and-personal views of how the Nazis do business. The common potential enemy temporarily and to a limited extent overrides the feuds and allows some cooperation. The Ukrainians turn a blind eye toward small-scale smuggling of vital materials across the Ukrainian/Polish border. That, plus stockpiling, allows the Poles to avoid the early collapse of their economy under the blockade.
The Ukrainians and Poles also quietly do a bit of joint military contingency planning. The Poles are also in contact with the French and English, sounding them out on their attitudes if Germany tries to grab the rest of Poland. The French and English are treaty bound to come to the aid of Poland if its remaining territory is attacked. Whether or not they will actually help the Poles this time is uncertain. Leaders in both countries realize that letting the Germans finish and consolidate their conquest of the Soviet Union would mean facing a much more powerful Germany in the future. A strong school of thought in both countries prefers war with the Germans soon, while their forces are still tied down in the Soviet Union. The French and English fear that they will be unable to finance militaries strong enough to balance the Germans in the long run if the Soviet Union is completely knocked out of the war.
One factor in the equation is that the balance of numbers in the air has turned very much against the Germans. The Germans have been concentrating their production efforts on tanks and trucks for the panzer divisions, while barely replacing lost aircraft. The French and English have both been re-equipping their airforces with more modern types, and collectively out-producing the Germans by nearly three to one over the last year. The English now have a working radar chain, while the French are building a less effective system based on similar principles, and trying to get access to the British technology.
The Poles were able to break the German Enigma codes up until 1938 or early 1939 in both time-lines. In this time-line, they've been cooperating with the English and French, and have regained that ability to some extent, though by no means completely. All three countries know from those intercepts that Hitler is planning to invade the rest of Poland in the spring of 1941 if he can finish off the Soviet Union before winter. The question is how can they preempt Hitler while not appearing to be the aggressors?
The Ukrainians provide the spark. They have infiltrated the Ukrainian end of the German inspired coup plot. The plot calls for heavy though usually behind the scenes involvement of German security personnel and army units. The Ukrainians have built up a good security apparatus. The English, who get the details from intercepts, also tips them off to the German part of the plan.
The Ukrainian government quietly arrests the Ukrainian plotters before that part of the coup can get off the ground, then move overwhelming forces into place to try to deter the Germans from moving. That doesn't work. The Germans try to move up the timing and make their move. Fighting breaks out between Ukrainian and German security forces, then their armies.
The local German forces are no match for the Ukrainian army. Some of their most combat-ready forces are now on the Polish/German border. Hitler realizes that he has to move fast or the Ukrainians will round up German forces in the Ukraine. He orders several divisions back from the German/Soviet front. Those forces will take a while to disengage and move to the Ukraine. In the meantime, the closest major German forces to the fighting are the divisions on the German/Polish border. Hitler decides to move five of those divisions through Poland to link up with besieged German troops in what had been the Polish Ukraine. The Polish leadership initially agrees, and two of the five divisions go across Poland into western Ukraine. Most of a third division is across, but with its heavy weapons still en route, when the Poles decide to close their borders to further movements.
Hitler is absolutely furious. He thinks that the Poles deliberately double-crossed him, mouse-trapping his divisions in an untenable position. That isn't true. The Poles are vacillating. They have no great love for the Ukrainians, but total German control of the Ukraine means that the Germans really can impose a complete economic blockade. The Poles can't afford to be in that position, especially when they know the Germans intend to attack in the spring.
The Ukrainians have known about the coup plot for well over a month, and they have carefully planned what to do if it comes off. The Ukrainian army quickly rounds up most of the German troops in the country, and seizes control of the German logistics and communications networks in the Ukraine. They also seize German airbases inside the country. German troops hold out in several minor pockets, as well as major ones in the formerly Polish Ukraine and in the Crimea.
The Ukrainians have been expecting and dreading a war with the Germans since the alliance with Germany began. They have systematically misled the Germans about the size and capabilities of their forces since the beginning. They have squirreled away captured weapons and designed a mobilization plan to take advantage of those weapons. German intelligence is aware of some of those preparations, and that knowledge was part of the reason for the coup attempt. The Germans are surprised by the scope of Ukrainian preparations though, and they pay a price as the Ukrainians mobilize and attack the remaining German pockets.
Hitler wants very much to slice through Poland and into the western Ukraine. He knows that will probably mean war with France and England. He doesn't care very much, as long as he can destroy Polish and Ukrainian resistance before France mobilizes. He is reasonably sure he can do that. If he does, then he can switch enough forces back to hold off the French, then knock the Soviets the rest of the way out of the war. Then he can switch the bulk of his combat-hardened army back from the old Soviet Union and get his revenge for the German defeat in World War I.
An attack through Poland is very much a gamble, but Hitler is a gambler. He also knows that if Poland gets away with closing its borders and the Ukraine becomes truly independent and hostile, then supplies to the entire eastern front would have to be funneled through Prussia and then through Lithuania. That would make a fragile logistics situation impossible.
The decision to attack Poland is not totally stupid given Hitler's appraisal of the situation. That appraisal misses several key things though. First, the Soviets are by no means out of the war. They have been training and re-equipping, and planning a nasty surprise for the Germans in the winter of 1940/41. Second, the plan assumes that the Poles can be caught before they mobilize. That's unlikely because the Poles know about the decision before it is even finalized. Third, the plan assumes that German divisions on the French border are equivalent to the ones fighting the Soviets. That is simply not true. Quiet fronts that are likely to remain quiet tend to attract and keep men who are not particularly eager to fight. That has been happening on the French/German border since the beginning of the war. The key German divisions that are to do this lightning attack are simply not very good. They aren't very well equipped either. The two panzer divisions are equipped with worn out Panzer I and IIs. The rest of the equipment is obsolete too.
In mid-September 1940, the Germans try a blitz against the Poles, trying to knock them out in a matter of days. They have to end the war before the French can mobilize. It doesn't work. The Poles and the French know from intercepts when Hitler has committed to the offensive. The Poles are already partly mobilized and aware of the direction, timing, and aims of the German offensive. A couple of hours before it is supposed to start, the Polish airforce launches a carefully rehearsed attack on key German targets-primarily airfields and panzer staging areas. Ethnic Polish guerillas from the areas taken from Poland in 1939 dress in German uniforms and use German military equipment captured by the Poles in the 1939 war to pose as German troops and disrupt the offensive. The Poles also launch small spoiling offensives along the border, trying to catch German troops forming up.
None of that makes a great deal of difference militarily, but it does make an already difficult German task that much more difficult. The Nazis try to make propaganda use of the fact that the Poles attacked first, but pay the price of past lies. Nobody believes them, not even most Germans.
The German attack goes forward, but not very quickly. It bogs down within a week, nowhere close to breaking through to the western Ukraine. To make matters worse for the Germans, the French and British declare war on Germany. The French have spent the last year contemplating the fact that they were incapable of helping the Poles in 1939, even if they had chosen to do so. Their mobilization would have been to slow to give them a military option in September 1939, and they know it.
The French have been conducting a series of large-scale "military training exercises" throughout the summer of 1940, calling up the reservists for a different set of divisions each month and giving them weeks of intensive training before sending them home and calling up the next batch. That gives them a head start on mobilization, especially when they hold one month's reservists while calling up the next month's. The French mobilize relatively quickly, and start small-scale attacks along the French/German borders.
Stalin takes advantage of German distraction to move up his own offensive. It is a massive and ambitious affair, involving thousands of carefully hoarded Soviet tanks. Those tanks now include large quantities of T20's, a new Soviet tank derived from the BT-7 series. The T20 is at about the level of the Soviet A20 prototypes of our time-line. It has the well-sloped armor of our time-line's T34, but without the armor thickness and with a shorter gun. It isn't as big of a revelation to the Germans as the T34 was in our time-line, but it is an unpleasant surprise, as are the masses of KV-1's and KV-2's. The Germans are trying to hold a huge front, and their most mobile forces are on the way back to the Ukraine. The Soviets break through in several places, cutting off dozens of German divisions, and threatening the entire Eastern front with collapse.
So in late 1940 the Germans have conquered much more of the Soviet Union than they ever did in our time-line. At the same time they have put themselves in a position where they are fighting a still formidable Soviet remnant, while at the same time fighting Poland, the Ukraine, and soon France and England. What happens next? What does Hitler do next? Which enemy does he send the main power of the German army against? Do England and France fight a real war instead of a phony one in this time-line? By late September the Ukrainians are calling for a French/English expeditionary force to help the Ukraine. Do they get it? Does it come in time if it comes?
That's a lot of questions, but for the moment I've run out of time and space for answers. I'd be very interested in your ideas on where this time-line would go from here.