I
would think that the plausible way to a Soviet victory, defined as
the Soviets become the major world power while the US is not a major
factor on the world stage would be:
(1) France holds the
Germans on the Meuse, or successfully counterattacks, resulting in a
stabilized line on the Western Front in 1940. To some that may sound
ASB, but it probably isn't. To make it happen, (a) the French would
have to forget about the Breda variant that sent 7 of their best
divisions, including their best DLM (light armored division) on a
wild goose chase all the way across Belgium and into Holland, putting
them in the worst possible position to cope with the actual German
attack, (b) Substitute a less ambitious advance for the Dyle plan,
and (c) Phase in the Dewoitine 520 either sooner or later than they
did historically, so that that a very high percentage of French
fighter wings were NOT in the process of switching over and not
initially available. The French active and "A" Series
divisions were quite capable of stopping the Germans if they were dug
in, had their artillery registered and had some modicum of air cover
and a reasonable amount of front to cover.
(2) As a result, the
Germans and the Allies fight until they are financially drained,
which would probably happen by late 1941 or early 1942 for the
Allies. Given the amount of Allied orders for aircraft, etc, in the
US, the US would probably grudgingly keep the Allies financially
afloat, but barely and with onerous provisions in the loan
agreements. For the Germans, insolvency would happen sooner unless
the Soviets did increasingly large barter agreements, which they
probably would for a price in German industrial machinery.
(3)
With the Allies and Germans concentrating on fighting one another,
the Soviets pick off some plum targets like taking a portion of
Northern Iran.
(4)
The Soviets build up in the Far East, and push aid to the Chinese
Nationalists and Communists to disperse Japanese efforts, then in
fall 1941 or spring 1942 they do a sneak attack on Japanese-held
Manchuria, which, assuming it succeeds (not a foregone conclusion but
not impossible), robs Japan of its major source of a lot of natural
resources. The China incident would have bankrupted the Japanese by
sometime in 1942 anyway, so the Soviets are now minus one major rival
in the east.
(5) In the fall of 1942, the Soviets find some
pretext to cut off raw material supplies to the Germans, forcing the
Germans into a do it now or die attack in the west. The Soviets then
join the Allies, and partition Germany.
All of the goodness of
the historic World War II, but with no devastating German attack on
the Soviet Union and with the western allies soaking up the bulk of
the casualties. All of this, and the US has no large standing army
built up, and no presence on the European continent. France and
Britain are used up, and soon face the loss of their colonies. The US
gets stiffed on their loans by the bankrupt Allies and goes
isolationist. The Soviet Union is now the big dog, with no functional
great power rivals. The Soviets don't have to go to war to dominate
the part of Europe they don't physically control.
And that is
a major dystopia in my book. One of the worst possible outcomes to
World War II.
Let's
play this out. Sometime in 1940, after the Germans have stalemated in
France, Hitler decides that instead of building up for another
attempt to take France out of the war before the British builds its
army up so the Allies massively outnumber the Germans in divisions
and especially firepower (which they'll accomplish by mid-1941) he'll
start building up to attack the Soviet Union. He'll need at least as
much time as he took in our timeline, so figure the buildup starts in
November or December 1940 at the latest.
What's going on in
France meantime. Let's assume that the attempt to take France starts
on schedule on May 10. Without getting into the details of the
battle, the Germans need to break out on the Meuse on May 14th/15th.
If they don't the French consolidate their lines and a breakthrough
becomes less and less likely. By end of May it would be apparent that
the offensive has failed and the French/British are firmly entrenched
in Belgium.
The Germans will have lost at least as many
planes as they did historically (around a thousand I believe, from
old and possibly faulty memory) and will have at least as many pilots
shot down and captured (400, which the French historically gave back
as part of their surrender). As spearheads, the Panzer divisions will
have taken heavy casualties.
If there is no breakthrough the
French will be fighting the war they trained for, a relatively
slow-paced methodical battle where skill at handling artillery is
king. The French and British will both be building their airforces,
and as I recall it, the British alone were outbuilding the Germans in
terms of fighters by June 1940, while the French were finally getting
modern fighters to their airforce. And the British and French had
huge orders for planes and aero-engines with the US.
The
Germans would almost certainly regroup, rebuild and try at least once
more for a breakthrough, probably in late July 1940. That attempt
would have less chance of success than the previous one because the
French would have a modicum of combat experience, are already in
position which means they don't have to surge into Belgium and the
balance in the air will have swung against the Germans to some
extent. The Germans fail, losing more tanks and planes, as do the
French and British, but the Allies are building faster than the
Germans.
At this point, the Germans have a choice. They can
make another attempt at a breakthrough, probably after a couple of
months of rebuilding, which means September or they can go on the
defensive. The defensive is a losing game. The British are building
up from a tiny force of ten divisions to one more befitting a Great
Power. They alone are outbuilding the Germans in terms of planes, not
counting French production and the flood coming from the US. The
French alone are outbuilding the Germans in terms of tanks (I'm 95%
sure).
If Germany stays on the defensive, they are actually
fighting the war France has built and trained for, a methodical
battle of attrition where artillery is king and the French are very
good at that kind of battle. The odds against the Germans get longer
with each month that they fight that kind of battle. They will lose
control of the air. They will face ever- increasing numbers of French
tanks that, while they make horrible panzers, are pretty good at this
kind of war. German war industry will not be able to keep up with the
need for munitions in this kind of war, making it difficult to
stockpile munitions for any attack on the Soviet Union.
In all
likelihood, the Germans will try one more time, because if they don't
they will inevitably lose the war. So, following the assumptions of
this scenario they would attack one more time in September or
October, trying to turn the war mobile, into their kind of war. And
they fail.
Winter would make further offensives unlikely until
spring. The Germans are facing increasing weight of Allied firepower
and trying to keep up with munitions production. By the spring of
1941, the Allies have a decisive numerical edge in the air. They'll
have more divisions, more tanks, and more firepower.
This
would all be nullified if Germany attacks the Soviets anyway, but
that’s unlikely. Germany has to anticipate that they will
be facing a war of attrition in 1941 that they will lose . That's the
situation where they would have to make a decision to invade the
Soviet Union, cutting their already outnumbered forces in the west in
half. Let's say they go totally insane and decide to go for it
anyway. Does anyone among the historic minor allies go along with
them? The Finns weren't fools. Chances are they wouldn't with the
odds this obviously against the Germans.
The Romanians? They
were tacit Allies of the French and British until France fell. The
Germans would probably have to fight their way through Romania if
they wanted to invade the Soviet Union that way, and, by the way they
would have just made enemies of the country where they were getting
most of their oil, and the Romanians were quite open about their
ability to sabotage the oil fields in the event of a German invasion.
The Croats would presumably still be part of Yugoslavia in this
scenario.
The Germans would have to go in without significant
allies, without the ability to go through Finland or Romania, on a
narrow front, with the Allies already dominant in the air in the
west, with munitions already being depleted faster than they could be
produced, at staggeringly long odds on both front. Hitler wouldn't
order an attack under those circumstances. If he did the German army
would almost certainly not obey those obviously suicidal orders.
A
German army engaged against the French and British wouldn't have
anywhere close to the divisions to tackle the Soviet Union, and the
odds would be lopsided enough that even Hitler couldn't delude
himself that he stood a chance. Even if he did the German army
wouldn't have similar delusions.
The victory over France made
the invasion of the Soviet Union seem doable to both Hitler and the
German army for several reasons: (1) It gave an example of a quick
and easy victory over a well-armed opponent, giving the Germans a
strong taste of 'victory disease'. (2) The Germans now had the huge
and pretty good French artillery park, as well as access to captured
French oil reserves, French trucks, etc. (3) They had no substantive
continental opponent and could concentrate essentially all of their
good divisions in the attack. (4) They had ammunition reserves that
would be used up in this scenario. (5) The victory consolidated
Hitler's power over the army and his prestige,
I
feel awkward arguing this, because I once did a scenario where
Germany failed to take France, but ended up attacking the Soviet
Union, but realistically that wasn't an option.
Another
possible flaw: If Japan goes South, the US would probably be pulled
in. That’s not impossible, but it is unlikely. As
to why the French not falling would (actually more like might) keep
the Japanese from going after French Indochina, here are the
situations in the two timelines in late 1940/early 1941:
Our
reality: France is defeated. Its army has been reduced to 100,000
men. The Germans don't allow the French to send additional aircraft
or tanks to IndoChina. The French navy (what's left of it after the
British sunk several vessels to keep them from falling into German
hands) is sitting in port. It can't leave port without the Germans
saying okay. French IndoChina is part of a beaten empire. It's there
for the taking.
Alternate reality: France has beaten two or
three German offensives. They are clearly becoming more powerful.
They have a huge and combat experienced army. That army is tied up at
the moment in Europe, but there are no guarantees it will be in a
year or two. The French are building a huge airforce with their own
production plus US planes. Those planes are tied up in Europe at the
moment, but again maybe not in a year or two. French navy: By no
means a match for the Japanese, but still a Great Power navy and
available to fight.
So which is more likely: Japan snaps up an
isolated colony from a defeated France, or it takes on a Great Power
France, distracted but not defeated?
Here's another issue: If
Germany doesn't attack the Soviets, the Soviets are automatically
more powerful in the Far East, because they don't have to divert
forces from there to fight the Germans. That means that the Japanese
have to fear a Soviet attack into Manchuria, whether or not it
actually happens. That means they have to keep troops there that were
historically used in the south. Most of the Japanese troops that were
historically used to take Malaysia, the Philippines and DEI were
taking directly or indirectly from Manchuria.
Soviet Union
tied up fighting Germans = Japan stronger in the south.
Soviet
Union not tied up fighting Germans = Japan weaker in the south.
Posted
on Feb 4, 2012.
More
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What you see here is a
truncated on-line version of
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